

Message Text

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TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: CBM'S: SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA FOR AREA AND THRESHOLD
PARAMETERS

REF: A. STATE 84111 B. US NATO 1854

1. U.S. REP CIRCULATED CONTENTS OF PARAS 2-7 REF A TO
ALLIES IN CAUCUS ON APRIL 14. ALLIES EXPRESSED APPRECIATION
FOR INDEPENDENT U.S. ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET NATIONAL MANEUVERS,
WHICH THEY SAID PROVIDED NEW INSIGHTS AND PERSPECTIVE ON DATA
PROVIDED BY UK AND NATO IMS (REF B).

2. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON SIGNIFICANCE OF U.S.
AND UK DATA FOR AREA AND THRESHOLD PARAMETERS. SUMMING UP
DISCUSSION, CANADIAN CHAIRMAN DREW ATTENTION TO CONCLUSION
FROM UK DATA THAT 75 PERCENT OF MANEUVERS WITHIN 700 KMS
OF SOVIET WESTERN FRONTIERS WERE CLOSE TO FRONTIER, AND WOULD
IN FACT BE COVERED BY A 100 KM BORDER BAND OF SOVIET TERRITORY.
HE NOTED NATO IMS JUDGEMENT THAT 100 KM BAND MIGHT THUS BE
ACCEPTABLE, IF DATA IS ACCURATE, AND SUGGESTED THAT
ALLIES REFLECT ON POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SUCH A SIGNIFI-
CANT REDUCTION OF SOVIET TERRITORY TO BE COVERED BY
MANEUVERS MEASURE.

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3. WITH REGARD TO THRESHOLD, CHAIRMAN OBSERVED THAT U.S. DATA, IN PARTICULAR ESTIMATE IN PARA 7 THAT ACTUAL SOVIET NATIONAL MANEUVERS ABOVE DIVISION LEVEL IN WESTERN ND'S AND OTHER WP COUNTRIES PROBABLY RANGE BETWEEN 40 AND 50 ON ANNUAL BASIS, SEEMED TO CORROBORATE UK TOTAL OF 48 SOVIET MANEUVERS, ALTHOUGH AREAS COVERED BY U.S. AND UK STUDIES MIGHT NOT BE EXACTLY THE SAME. HE ALSO NOTED U.S. JUDGEMENT THAT MANY OF THESE SOVIET MANEUVERS PROBABLY INVOLVE ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE DIVISIONS, AND WOULD THUS NEED TO BE NOTIFIED WITH A THRESHOLD AT 18-25,000 LEVEL, WHILE MANY OF THE CHARACTERISTICALLY SMALLER NATO MANEUVERS WOULD NOT NEED TO BE NOTIFIED. AS HIS CONCLUSION, CHAIRMAN WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR PRECISE NUMERICAL EXPRESSION OF THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION, BEARING IN MIND THAT CONSEQUENCE OF A FIGURE IN THE 18-25,000 RANGE WOULD FAVOR NATO SO HEAVILY AS TO GIVE APPEARANCE OF AN UNBALANCED RESULT. IN ORDER TO AVOID CHARGE THAT ALLIES WERE SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, CHAIRMAN SUGGESTED THAT ALLIES INSTEAD CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF USING UNIT DESCRIPTION (E.G., REINFORCED DIVISION) TO DESIGNATE THRESHOLD, OR SOME OTHER LESS PRECISE BUT STILL MEANINGFUL TERM. IF LESS PRECISE TERM WERE USED, ALLIES COULD IN PRACTICE ANNOUNCE MANEUVERS AT A SLIGHTLY LOWER LEVEL THAN WARSAW PACT, AND THUS REDRESS SOMEWHAT THE BALANCE OF NOTIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY THE TWO RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES.

4. COMMENT: WHILE CHAIRMAN'S CONCLUSIONS APPEAR REASONABLE TO US, TO THE EXTENT THAT UK DATA CAN BE ASSUMED TO BE RELATIVELY ACCURATE, WE ALSO NOTE THAT DISPROPORTION IN OBLIGATION OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT TO NOTIFY WOULD BE LEAST AT LOWEST THRESHOLD LEVEL OF 12,000. THUS, WE WOULD FAVOR AN ADDITIONAL EFFORT IN FORTHCOMING PARAMETERS DISCUSSION TO BRING WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO ACCEPT A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD AS CLOSE TO ALLIED POSITION OF 12,000 AS POSSIBLE, POINTING OUT THAT A LOW THRESHOLD WILL BE NECESSARY TO ACTIVATE A MEANINGFUL NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS OF ALLIED MANEUVERS. MOREOVER, ABANDONING IDEA THAT THRESHOLD SHOULD BE

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EXPRESSED IN NUMBERS WOULD REMOVE INDUCEMENT TO SOVIETS TO GIVE A PRECISE FIGURE FOR A THRESHOLD THEY CAN ACCEPT, INSTEAD OF UNDEFINED "ARMY CORPS."

5. AS FOR CHAIRMAN'S QUESTION ON REDUCING ALLIED GOALS FOR INCLUSION OF SOVIET TERRITORY, WE DO NOT SEE NEED FOR SUCH A MAJOR SCALEBACK IN NEAR FUTURE. ALLIES ALREADY HAVE LATITUDE TO DROP FROM 700 TO 500 KM

AT TACTICALLY PROPITIOUS MOMENT. IN ADDITION, A MAJOR
FALLBACK WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO NEUTRALS
WITHOUT DRAWING ON INTELLIGENCE DATA.DALE

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